Viewing entries tagged
fofeiture

Restoration Comedy

United States v. Pescatore, No. 10-0520-cr (2d Cir. February 23, 2011) (Kearse, Winter, Hall, CJJ)

In connection with a plea agreement that covered both a long-running chop-shop operation and an extortion scheme, Michael Pescatore agreed to accept a 132 month sentence, a $2.5 million forfeiture and “no less than $3 million” in restitution. The agreement specified that the prosecutors would recommend that the forfeited assets be transferred to the victims, a process known as “restoration,” but that the ultimate decision lay with the Department of Justice, which would “make its decision in accordance with applicable law.”

At Pescatore’s 2008 sentencing, the court imposed the agreed-upon sentence, including $3 million in restitution, to be paid in full by the end of 2009. The written Judgment reflected this order, but did not contain the names of the victims to whom Pescatore owed restitution or the amounts to which they were entitled. In early 2009, the government wrote to the district court and asked it to correct the Judgment to incorporate the victim-loss tables in the PSR, and the court granted the motion, filing an amended Judgment that incorporated this information.

In April of 2009, the government notified Pescatore that the DOJ had denied the restoration request. Six months later, he moved in the district court for “specific performance” of the restoration portion of the plea agreement, and also sought to be relied from the $3 million in restitution, arguing that the total loss to his victims was less than that amount. The district court held a hearing on these applications in January of 2010 and denied them both. It noted that Pescatore had not made any restitution payments even though the deadline had passed, and gave him thirty days to pay the $3 million. Pescatore then sought a stay of the restitution order from the circuit, which denied it. But he still never paid the money.

On appeal, Pescatore pursued these same claims. The circuit affirmed but, because it was true that the total loss to the victims was less than $3 million, the court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The court first found no merit to Pescatore’s complaint about the government’s decision to retain the forfeited assets instead of restoring them to his victims. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981(e), permits the Justice Department to do either based on an exercise of its own discretion. And there was nothing in Pescatore’s plea agreement that placed any constraints on that discretion. The line prosecutors were obligated only to “recommend” restoration, which they did, and the promise that the DOJ would act “in accordance with applicable law” was not a “promise to grant restoration so long as it is not prohibited.” Without deciding whether this type of decision is subject to judicial review, the appellate court noted that the government had put on the record a reason for the refusal - Pescatore “actually does have assets” - and that Pescatore did not contest this.

As for restitution, the circuit agreed that the true amount of the loss to Pescatore’s victims was not $3 million, it was more like $2.56 million, and rejected the government’s claim that the amended Judgment was already in this amount. While the amended Judgment incorporated the PSR’s victim-loss tables, those tables did not contain a total, and the total amount specified in the amended Judgment remained at $3 million.

But, because Pescatore did not object to this amount when he was originally sentenced, the circuit reviewed only for plain error and concluded that he met only three of the four parts of the plain error test. The incorrect restitution amount was an “error,” that was “plain,” and affected Pescatore’s “substantial rights.” But it did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation” of the proceedings because, as far as the circuit was concerned, Pescatore simply “flouted” the restitution order by refusing to comply with it without obtaining a stay.

Even after the circuit denied his application for a stay, he made no effort to expedite the appeal. To the contrary, he missed two filing deadlines that resulted in dismissals and reinstatements. His “election” to “disobey the Judgment” therefore caused him to flunk final prong of the plain error test.

Even so, the court sent the case back for further proceedings. Pescatore must now pay the full $3 million, and will be subject to statutory interest and financial penalties as a result of his tardiness. If the total of the principal, interest and penalties is less than $3 million he will be entitled to a refund of the difference.


Forfeit To Be Tied

United States v. Schlesinger, No. 05-03021-cr (2d Cir. January 30, 2008) (Jacobs, Parker, Wesley, CJJ) (per curiam)

Schlesinger, convicted of mail and wire fraud, made a clever, but unfortunately not clever enough, argument challenging the forfeiture of the proceeds.

The district court had relied on 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (2005), which provides that a criminal forfeiture can be alleged in the indictment when “no specific statutory provision is made for criminal forfeiture upon conviction.” Schlesinger pointed out that there is a specific statutory provision for forfeiture of mail and wire fraud offenses, thus § 2461(c) should not apply, but also that the specific provision, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A), applies only to the proceeds of frauds affecting a financial institution, which was not the case here. As the circuit summarized it, although it is not an image one would care to dwell on, Schlesinger argued that the government “falls between two stools.”

The circuit affirmed because the forfeiture here was a civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981, which does not limit forfeitures to frauds affecting financial institutions.

IF THE CRIME DOESN’T FIT THEY CAN’T FORFEIT

United States v. Capoccia, No. 06-0669-cr (2d Cir. September 19, 2007) (Sotomayer, Katzmann, CJJ, Gertner, DJ)

In this case, the district court erred in ordering forfeiture of the proceeds of conduct that occurred prior to the date of the conduct with which the defendant was charged. The decision turned on a very narrow reading of the indictment, as well as on the nature of the statute under which the defendant was charged.

At issue was money that Capoccia, a lawyer, misappropriated from a credit counseling/debt reduction service that he founded. Capoccia was convicted of misappropriating unearned client retainer fees, failing to give complete refunds to clients who withdrew from the program, and embezzling client escrow funds that was supposed to be paid to credit card companies to settle clients’ debts.

Capoccia was charged with interstate transportation of stolen money under 18 U.S.C. § 2314. While the indictment referenced a “scheme” that existed between 1997 and 2002, the earliest actual interstate money transfers with which he was charged occurred on May 24, 2000. Despite this, the district court ordered Capoccia to forfeit the proceeds from pre-May 2000 transfers.

The court of appeals reversed. Reading the indictment very closely, it distinguished between language that “refer[ed] to the existence of” the scheme and that which “charge[d]” a scheme. [emphasis in original]. The court concluded that only the charging portion of the indictment, which listed the particular transactions that the government alleged to be violations of § 2314, determined the conduct that could be the basis of a forfeiture. Since the earliest discrete act listed occurred on May 24, 2000, the district court erred in ordering the forfeiture of the proceeds of earlier transactions.

In addition, the court relied on the nature of the particular offense with which Capoccia was charged. He was accused under the first paragraph of § 2314, which criminalizes only individual acts of transportation of stolen property, and not the second paragraph, which criminalizes, inter alia, a scheme or artifice to defraud. Accordingly, the indictment’s reference to conduct from before 2000 was treated as “background” for the specific acts alleged in the charging paragraphs, but did not itself charge a violation of the statute encompassing pre-May 2000 conduct.

Finally, the court held that, not only did the indictment did not charge Capoccia with pre-May 2000 conduct, the government failed to establish a nexus between the earlier transfers and the conduct of which he was convicted. Purely as a matter of logic, the government could not establish that the funds involved in earlier transactions were “obtained ... as the result” of the later ones.

Comment: This is a nice win for Capoccia, since the amount involved is more than $1.1 million dollars.