Viewing entries tagged
stolen property

A Crime of Violins

United States v. Sprysak, No. 07-3353-cr (2c Cir. October 22, 2008) (Newman, Calabresi, Parker, CJJ)

Adam Potocki was convicted of conspiracy to sell stolen property, a Stradivarius violin that was later determined to be fake. The court of appeals held that the evidence was insufficient on two elements: whether Potocki believed the violin was worth at least five thousand dollars, and whether the offense involved goods that moved in interstate commerce.

Background

Potocki was an associate of Krzysztof Sprysak, who was part of a Brooklyn criminal gang known as the “Greenpoint Crew.” Sprysak called Potocki in December of 2005 to tell him that he might have a Stradivarius violin to sell. He said that the violin had been brought from Europe illegally and was stolen. Potocki agreed to show an antiques dealer a picture of the violin so that it could be appraised, and said that the dealer might be able to sell the violin as well.

In later conversations, Potocki said that the appraiser needed to see the violin itself, not just a photograph, because there are “many fakes.” In their final conversation, Potocki pressed Sprysak to bring the violin to him quickly. Nothing ever happened, and they never spoke about the violin again.

Unbeknownst to Potocki, Sprysak began looking into selling the violin through two other people, one of whom was an informant. In early 2006, the Sprysak and his new conspirators brought the violin from New Jersey to Manhattan to meet with an appraiser, who was actually and undercover detective. It was ultimately determined to be counterfeit, worth no more than one thousand dollars.

Discussion

The court first held that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Potocki believed that the violin was worth at least five thousand dollars, a requirement of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2315. The conversations between Potocki and Sprysak only showed that Potocki “anxiously entertained the possibility” that the violin might be valuable, even as he noted that there were many counterfeit Strads. He never expressed a belief that the violin was both genuine and valuable; rather, he merely hoped that these would both be true. Potocki’s “serious questions” about the “provenance and value of the violin” meant that the government “failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Potocki’s belief that the instrument was worth at least five thousand dollars.”

The government also failed to prove the interstate commerce element of § 2315, which requires that the stolen goods must have “crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen.” Here, the government attempted to satisfy this element by showing that the instrument had been brought from New Jersey to New York for the 2006 meeting. But there was no evidence that Potocki knew that the meeting occurred, let alone its background, participants or purpose.

Thus, there was no evidence that Potocki’s discussions with Sprysak months earlier were part of a broader “collective venture” to help Sprysak sell the violin in 2006. Rather, Sprysak abandoned the possibility of working with Potocki and “sought out other avenues to achieve a sale.” Thus, this was not a “classic conspiracy” - an “overarching illegal enterprise with multiple members and sustained, organized objectives.”

Comment

Judge Calabresi wrote a short opinion, concurring dubitante - which means, roughly, “doubting the correctness of the decision.” He felt that the evidence might reasonably show that Potocki attributed a value of more than $5000 to the violin since, “[e]ven if Potocki held only a 1 in 100 hope that the violin was a Stradivarius (which he told Sprysak, could fetch 1.5 million dollars), the expected value to him would still be $15,000, well above the $5000 required by the statute.” Since the government did not advocate this approach, however, the court was not really wrong to reject it, although he found the matter “a tad puzzling.”

Puzzling to this commentator is Judge Calabresi’s agreement with the majority - and the majority’s view itself - on the interstate commerce element. Here, the evidence was clear that when Sprysak first approached Potocki he told him that the violin had been brought from Europe and was stolen. Potocki must therefore have believed that the violin was stolen in Europe, then brought to the United States from there. This belief would seem to clearly satisfy the statute.

IF THE CRIME DOESN’T FIT THEY CAN’T FORFEIT

United States v. Capoccia, No. 06-0669-cr (2d Cir. September 19, 2007) (Sotomayer, Katzmann, CJJ, Gertner, DJ)

In this case, the district court erred in ordering forfeiture of the proceeds of conduct that occurred prior to the date of the conduct with which the defendant was charged. The decision turned on a very narrow reading of the indictment, as well as on the nature of the statute under which the defendant was charged.

At issue was money that Capoccia, a lawyer, misappropriated from a credit counseling/debt reduction service that he founded. Capoccia was convicted of misappropriating unearned client retainer fees, failing to give complete refunds to clients who withdrew from the program, and embezzling client escrow funds that was supposed to be paid to credit card companies to settle clients’ debts.

Capoccia was charged with interstate transportation of stolen money under 18 U.S.C. § 2314. While the indictment referenced a “scheme” that existed between 1997 and 2002, the earliest actual interstate money transfers with which he was charged occurred on May 24, 2000. Despite this, the district court ordered Capoccia to forfeit the proceeds from pre-May 2000 transfers.

The court of appeals reversed. Reading the indictment very closely, it distinguished between language that “refer[ed] to the existence of” the scheme and that which “charge[d]” a scheme. [emphasis in original]. The court concluded that only the charging portion of the indictment, which listed the particular transactions that the government alleged to be violations of § 2314, determined the conduct that could be the basis of a forfeiture. Since the earliest discrete act listed occurred on May 24, 2000, the district court erred in ordering the forfeiture of the proceeds of earlier transactions.

In addition, the court relied on the nature of the particular offense with which Capoccia was charged. He was accused under the first paragraph of § 2314, which criminalizes only individual acts of transportation of stolen property, and not the second paragraph, which criminalizes, inter alia, a scheme or artifice to defraud. Accordingly, the indictment’s reference to conduct from before 2000 was treated as “background” for the specific acts alleged in the charging paragraphs, but did not itself charge a violation of the statute encompassing pre-May 2000 conduct.

Finally, the court held that, not only did the indictment did not charge Capoccia with pre-May 2000 conduct, the government failed to establish a nexus between the earlier transfers and the conduct of which he was convicted. Purely as a matter of logic, the government could not establish that the funds involved in earlier transactions were “obtained ... as the result” of the later ones.

Comment: This is a nice win for Capoccia, since the amount involved is more than $1.1 million dollars.